Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments, Desires and Motivation

According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the dis...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Eriksson, John (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2014
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2014, Volume: 17, Issue: 2, Pages: 253-267
Further subjects:B Motivation
B Desire
B Moral Judgment
B Occurrent states of mind
B Expressivism
B Dispositional states of mind
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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