Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?

In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibri...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Brun, Georg (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2014
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2014, Volume: 17, Issue: 2, Pages: 237-252
Further subjects:B Reflective Equilibrium
B Intuitionism
B Justification
B Coherentism
B Intuition
B Foundationalism
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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