RT Article
T1 The Expressivist Account of Punishment, Retribution, and the Emotions
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 16
IS 5
SP 1029
OP 1047
A1 Königs, Peter
LA English
YR 2013
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/178569779X
AB This paper provides a discussion of the role that emotions may play in the justification of punishment. On the expressivist account of punishment, punishment has the purpose of expressing appropriate emotional reactions to wrongdoing, such as indignation, resentment or guilt. I will argue that this expressivist approach fails as these emotions can be expressed other than through the infliction of punishment. Another argument for hard treatment put forward by expressivists states that punitive sanctions are necessary in order for the law to be valid. But this justification of punishment, too, is unconvincing. There are no good reasons to assume that we have to resort to punitive measures in order to vindicate the law. I will then raise the more general worry whether there is any intelligible link at all between moral emotions such as indignation, resentment or guilt and retributive behaviour. I will finally conclude with some sceptical remarks on the moral worth of retribution.
K1 Hard treatment
K1 Indignation
K1 Guilt
K1 Emotions
K1 Retribution
K1 Punishment
DO 10.1007/s10677-013-9402-y