Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons
Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2012
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2012, Volume: 15, Issue: 3, Pages: 403-419 |
| Further subjects: | B
Internalism
B Externalism B Shared intentionality B Empathy B Moral Motivation B Moral Reasons |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |