The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory

Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological natura...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Besser-Jones, Lorraine (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2012
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2012, Volume: 15, Issue: 2, Pages: 203-220
Further subjects:B Moral Motivation
B Empirical Research
B Moral judgments
B Practical Reason
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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