Coercive Interference and Moral Judgment

Coercion is by its very nature hostile to the individual subjected to it. At the same time, it often is a necessary evil: political life cannot function without at least some instances of coercion. Hence, it is not surprising that coercion has been the topic of heated philosophical debate for many d...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: van der Rijt, Jan-Willem (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2011
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2011, Volume: 14, Issue: 5, Pages: 549-567
Further subjects:B Coerciveness of the law
B Moralisation
B Moral Judgment
B Responsibility
B Coercion
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000naa a22000002 4500
001 1785696416
003 DE-627
005 20220112044105.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 220112s2011 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1007/s10677-011-9262-2  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1785696416 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1785696416 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a van der Rijt, Jan-Willem  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Coercive Interference and Moral Judgment 
264 1 |c 2011 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Coercion is by its very nature hostile to the individual subjected to it. At the same time, it often is a necessary evil: political life cannot function without at least some instances of coercion. Hence, it is not surprising that coercion has been the topic of heated philosophical debate for many decades. Though numerous accounts have been put forth in the literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the question what exactly being subjected to coercion does to an individual that makes it so hostile to his person. This paper develops an analysis of the subjective aspect of coercion whereby this hostility is explained. It is argued that coercion is not just a matter of interference with one’s agency, but also affects one’s morality. Because coercion is a form of subjugation it does more than merely limit one’s freedom, it constitutes an affront to one’s dignity as well. A new account of coercion is developed that pays particular attention to the subjectivity inherent in coercion. This account takes a middle ground in the ongoing debate between advocates of moralised and non-moralised conceptualisations of coercion. The paper closes by applying this account to two prominent issues in the literature on coercion: the use of coercion claims in attempts to avoid being held responsible for one’s actions, and the coerciveness of the law. 
650 4 |a Coerciveness of the law 
650 4 |a Responsibility 
650 4 |a Moralisation 
650 4 |a Moral Judgment 
650 4 |a Coercion 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Ethical theory and moral practice  |d Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1998  |g 14(2011), 5, Seite 549-567  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)320527093  |w (DE-600)2015306-5  |w (DE-576)104558555  |x 1572-8447  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:14  |g year:2011  |g number:5  |g pages:549-567 
856 |3 Volltext  |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/41472623  |x JSTOR 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9262-2  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4033755314 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1785696416 
LOK |0 005 20220112044105 
LOK |0 008 220112||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2021-12-30#8D484FD0787352AF2EE51CC7E127293B3F46B291 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 866   |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/41472623 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw