A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics
In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account for several basic tenets of...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
2011
|
| Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2011, Volume: 14, Número: 3, Páginas: 259-272 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Motives
B Pluralism B Right action B Virtue B Agent-basing |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000naa a22000002c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 1785696157 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20220112044104.0 | ||
| 007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220112s2011 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/s10677-010-9240-0 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)1785696157 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)KXP1785696157 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 084 | |a 1 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Doviak, Daniel |e VerfasserIn |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 2 | |a A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2011 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate the deontic axiom that “ought” implies “can”, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving “conflicting motives” and “motivational over-determination”. In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view. This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Virtue | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Right action | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Pluralism | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Motives | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Agent-basing | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Ethical theory and moral practice |d Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1998 |g 14(2011), 3, Seite 259-272 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)320527093 |w (DE-600)2015306-5 |w (DE-576)104558555 |x 1572-8447 |7 nnas |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:14 |g year:2011 |g number:3 |g pages:259-272 |
| 856 | |3 Volltext |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/41472593 |x JSTOR | ||
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9240-0 |x Resolving-System |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 935 | |a mteo | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| ELC | |a 1 | ||
| ITA | |a 1 |t 1 | ||
| LOK | |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 | ||
| LOK | |0 001 4033755055 | ||
| LOK | |0 003 DE-627 | ||
| LOK | |0 004 1785696157 | ||
| LOK | |0 005 20220112044104 | ||
| LOK | |0 008 220112||||||||||||||||ger||||||| | ||
| LOK | |0 035 |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2021-12-30#B39A306722142A4FD60BABA3D2013B7B24CB39C6 | ||
| LOK | |0 040 |a DE-Tue135 |c DE-627 |d DE-Tue135 | ||
| LOK | |0 092 |o n | ||
| LOK | |0 852 |a DE-Tue135 | ||
| LOK | |0 852 1 |9 00 | ||
| LOK | |0 866 |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/41472593 | ||
| LOK | |0 935 |a ixzs |a ixrk |a zota | ||
| ORI | |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw | ||
