Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes

In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard’s version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kahn, Leonard (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2011
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2011, Volume: 14, Issue: 2, Pages: 131-142
Further subjects:B Moral blameworthiness
B Reactive attitudes
B Gibbard
B Metaethics
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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