Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples
In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2010
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2010, Volume: 13, Issue: 2, Pages: 207-213 |
| Further subjects: | B
Principle of alternate possibilities
B Free Will B Frankfurt B Moral Responsibility |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |