On Sinnott-Armstrong’s Case Against Moral Intuitionism
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2010
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2010, Volume: 13, Issue: 1, Pages: 75-88 |
| Further subjects: | B
Disagreement
B Sinnott-Armstrong B Justification B Emotion B Moral intuitionism B Foundationalism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |