The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against its Epistemic Reduction
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only difference lying in what we get to know about some...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2009
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2009, Volume: 12, Issue: 3, Pages: 267-277 |
| Further subjects: | B
Character
B Graham Greene B Epistemic luck B Moral Luck |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |