What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?

Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encounte...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Horgan, Terry (Author) ; Timmons, Mark (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2009
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2009, Volume: 12, Issue: 1, Pages: 25-51
Further subjects:B Relevance problem
B Frame problem
B Particularism
B Computational cognitive science
B moral normativity
B Generalism
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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520 |a Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity. 
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