The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts
The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2008
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2008, Volume: 11, Issue: 3, Pages: 305-326 |
| Further subjects: | B
Disability
B Thick evaluative concepts B Moral Status B Person B Human Relationship B Great ape B Animal Rights B Fellow human |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |