Cognitivist Expressivism and the Nature of Belief

The paper is a critical examination of the metaethical position taken up recently by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, called ‘cognitivist expressivism’. The key component of the position is their insistence that some beliefs are nondescriptive. The paper argues against this thesis in two ways: First...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Majors, Brad (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2008
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2008, Volume: 11, Issue: 3, Pages: 279-293
Further subjects:B Phenomenology
B Belief
B Motivation
B Cognitivism
B Expressivism
B Representation
B Direction of fit
B Metaethics
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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