The Fictionalist’s Attitude Problem
According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but...
| Authors: | ; |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2007
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2007, Volume: 10, Issue: 5, Pages: 485-498 |
| Further subjects: | B
Moral Realism
B Frege–Geach problem B Fictionalism B Cognitivism B Factualism B Moral fictionalism B Expressivism B Error Theory B Moral acceptance B Metaethics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
