Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment
According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about...
| Autori: | ; |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
2007
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2007, Volume: 10, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 279-295 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Morphological rationalism
B Moral Experience B Rationalism in moral psychology B Moral Judgment B Intuitionism in moral psychology B Confabulation B Moral phenomenology |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
