Integrity and Demandingness
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
2007
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| Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2007, Volume: 10, Número: 3, Páginas: 255-265 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Non-consequentialism
B Extremism B Paradox of deontology B Value pluralism B Demandingness B Bernard Williams B Autonomy B Consequentialism B Integrity |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’ |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-007-9073-7 |
