Marriage, Morality, and Institutional Value

This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions not strictly required (or prohibited)...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Brake, Elizabeth (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2007
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2007, Volume: 10, Issue: 3, Pages: 243-254
Further subjects:B Rights
B Deontology
B Value
B Institution
B Marriage
B Kant
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

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