On the Moral Epistemology of Ideal Observer Theories
In this paper I attempt to defuse a set of epistemic worries commonly raised against ideal observer theories. The worries arise because of the omniscience often attributed to ideal observers -- how can we, as finite humans, ever have access to the moral judgements or reactions of omniscient beings?...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2006
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2006, Volume: 9, Issue: 3, Pages: 359-374 |
Further subjects: | B
Ethics
B normative properties B decision-procedure B Ideal Observer B moral epistemology |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |