Yet Another Revised DDE? A Note on David K. Chan's DDEd

David K. Chan wants to save the DDE from the considerable criticism levelled against it, by making the moral distinction it refers to rest on a difference in desire instead of in intention. I argue that the revised version, too, is counter-intuitive and confuses the blameworthiness of an actor with...

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1. VerfasserIn: Steinhoff, Uwe (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2006
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2006, Band: 9, Heft: 2, Seiten: 231-236
weitere Schlagwörter:B Blameworthiness
B Desire
B craniotomy
B hysterectomy
B Intention
B permission
B doctrine of double effect
B tactical bomber
B terror bomber
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Zusammenfassung:David K. Chan wants to save the DDE from the considerable criticism levelled against it, by making the moral distinction it refers to rest on a difference in desire instead of in intention. I argue that the revised version, too, is counter-intuitive and confuses the blameworthiness of an actor with the wrongness of the act. It also invites abuse instead of preventing it. Besides, Chan's DDE omits three of the four criteria of the traditional DDE, and it is couched in terms of lesser objectionability, while the traditional DDE is couched in terms of permission. Therefore, Chan's DDE has so little in common with the traditional DDE that it should not even count as a revised version of it.
ISSN:1572-8447
Enthält:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-005-9002-6