Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles

According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Stangl, Rebecca Lynn (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2006
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2006, Volume: 9, Issue: 2, Pages: 201-229
Further subjects:B default reasons
B moral particularism
B Jonathan Dancy
B Margaret Olivia Little
B heuristic principles
B moral epistemology
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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