Why Response-Dependence Theories of Morality are False

Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). Since our affective nature is purely...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Randel Koons, Jeremy (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2003
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2003, Volume: 6, Issue: 3, Pages: 275-294
Further subjects:B Morality
B Response-dependence
B Value
B Relativism
B Disposition
B Emotion
B Affect
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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520 |a Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). Since our affective nature is purely contingent, and not necessarily shared by all rational creatures (or even by all humans), response-dependence threatens to lead to relativism. In this paper, I will argue that emotional responses and moral features do not align in the way predicted by the response-dependence theorist who wishes to tie morality to emotional affect. I further argue that since response-dependence accounts that tie morality to any sort of affect (be it an emotion, a desire, a desire to desire, or so on) cannot explain the objectivity and universality of morality; and since we do not need a psychological response to play a truth-constituting role in morality in order to explain the normativity or content of morality, we should reject such response-dependence accounts. 
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