RT Article
T1 Practical rationality for pluralists about the good
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 6
IS 2
SP 161
OP 177
A1 Chappell, Timothy
LA English
YR 2003
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1785692720
AB I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the existence of a plurality of incommensurable goods incompatible with consequentialism.
K1 Practical rationality
K1 Normative ethics
K1 Incommensurability
K1 Deontology
K1 Consequentialism
K1 Axiology
DO 10.1023/A:1024472726317