Higher and Lower Pleasures – Doubts on Justification
According to the discontinuity view we can have a (lower) pleasure which, no matter how often a certain unit of it is added to itself, cannot become greater in value than a unit of another (higher) pleasure. All recent adherents of this view seem to rely basically on the same sort of reasoning which...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado: |
2002
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| En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2002, Volumen: 5, Número: 4, Páginas: 415-429 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Discontinuity
B preferences B J.S. Mill B Value B higher pleasures |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | According to the discontinuity view we can have a (lower) pleasure which, no matter how often a certain unit of it is added to itself, cannot become greater in value than a unit of another (higher) pleasure. All recent adherents of this view seem to rely basically on the same sort of reasoning which is referred to here as ‘the preference test’. This article presents three arguments, each of which indicates that the inference from the preference test to the discontinuity view is not conclusive. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1023/A:1021309407124 |