Higher and Lower Pleasures – Doubts on Justification
According to the discontinuity view we can have a (lower) pleasure which, no matter how often a certain unit of it is added to itself, cannot become greater in value than a unit of another (higher) pleasure. All recent adherents of this view seem to rely basically on the same sort of reasoning which...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2002
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2002, Volume: 5, Issue: 4, Pages: 415-429 |
Further subjects: | B
Discontinuity
B preferences B J.S. Mill B Value B higher pleasures |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |