Moral Testimony and its Authority

A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person's moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person's actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on act...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Nickel, Philip (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2001
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2001, Volume: 4, Issue: 3, Pages: 253-266
Further subjects:B Moral testimony
B Action
B Cognitivism
B Understanding
B Reasons
B Autonomy
B moral epistemology
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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