Rethinking our Maxims: Perceptual Salience and Practical Judgment in Kantian Ethics
Some contemporary Kantians have argued that one could not be virtuous without having internalized certain patterns of awareness that permit one to identify and respond reliably to moral reasons for action. I agree, but I argue that this insight requires unrecognized, far‐reaching, and thoroughly wel...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2001
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2001, Volume: 4, Issue: 3, Pages: 219-230 |
Further subjects: | B
moral blindness
B practical judgment B desires B moral salience B Herman (Barbara) B Responsibility B Kant (Immanuel) B Emotions B Virtues B Maxims |
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