Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases
I argue that the moral distinction in double effect cases rests on a difference not in intention as traditionally stated in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), but in desire. The traditional DDE has difficulty ensuring that an agent intends the bad effect just in those cases where what he does is m...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
2000
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2000, Volume: 3, Numéro: 4, Pages: 405-434 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Desire
B Intention B double effect B Responsibility B Practical Reasoning B agent evaluation B Virtue Ethics |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
