RT Article
T1 Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 3
IS 4
SP 365
OP 383
A1 Merritt, Maria
LA English
YR 2000
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1785691880
AB In this paper I examine and reply to a deflationary challenge brought against virtue ethics. The challenge comes from critics who are impressed by recent psychological evidence suggesting that much of what we take to be virtuous conduct is in fact elicited by narrowly specific social settings, as opposed to being the manifestation of robust individual character. In answer to the challenge, I suggest a conception of virtue that openly acknowledges the likelihood of its deep, ongoing dependence upon particular social relationships and settings. I argue that holding this conception will indeed cause problems for some important strands of thought in virtue ethics, most notably in the tradition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. But an approach to virtue ethics modeled on David Hume's treatment of virtue and character in A Treatise of Human Nature promises to escape these problems.
K1 Virtues
K1 Virtue Ethics
K1 Social cognitive theory
K1 Situationism
K1 Nicomachean Ethics
K1 Hume
K1 fundamental attribution error
K1 Character
K1 Aristotle
DO 10.1023/A:1009926720584