The Impact of Financial Incentives and Perceptions of Seriousness on Whistleblowing Intention

Many jurisdictions have put regulatory strategies in place to provide incentives and safeguards to whistleblowers to encourage whistleblowing on corporate wrongdoings. One such strategy is the provision of a financial incentive to the whistleblower if the complaint leads to a successful regulatory e...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Authors: Andon, Paul (Author) ; Free, Clinton (Author) ; Jidin, Radzi (Author) ; Monroe, Gary S. (Author) ; Turner, Michael J. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer 2018
In: Journal of business ethics
Year: 2018, Volume: 151, Issue: 1, Pages: 165-178
Further subjects:B Dodd–Frank Act
B Sarbanes–Oxley Act
B Seriousness
B Whistleblowing
B Moral awareness
B financial incentives
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000caa a22000002 4500
001 1785665456
003 DE-627
005 20230710121308.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 220112s2018 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1007/s10551-016-3215-6  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1785665456 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1785665456 
035 |a (DE-He213)s10551-016-3215-6-e 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Andon, Paul  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 4 |a The Impact of Financial Incentives and Perceptions of Seriousness on Whistleblowing Intention 
264 1 |c 2018 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Many jurisdictions have put regulatory strategies in place to provide incentives and safeguards to whistleblowers to encourage whistleblowing on corporate wrongdoings. One such strategy is the provision of a financial incentive to the whistleblower if the complaint leads to a successful regulatory enforcement action against the offending organization. We conducted an experiment using professional accountants as participants to examine whether such an incentive encourages potential whistleblowers to report an observed financial reporting fraud to a relevant external authority. We also examine the effect of perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing on accountants’ intention to whistleblow. We find that a financial incentive results in a higher intention to whistleblow to a relevant external authority. We also find that perceptions of the seriousness of the wrongdoing are significantly and positively associated with accountants’ intention to whistleblow to a relevant external authority. We find a significant interaction between the provision of a financial incentive and the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing on the intention to report the wrongdoing externally. The intention to report the financial reporting fraud externally is higher when the level of perceived seriousness is higher, regardless of the availability of a financial incentive. However, when the perceived level of seriousness is lower, the presence of financial incentive results in a higher intention to report the financial reporting fraud externally. These findings indicate that the impact of a financial incentive on the intention to whistleblow is moderated by perceptions of the seriousness of the wrongdoing. 
650 4 |a Moral awareness 
650 4 |a Seriousness 
650 4 |a financial incentives 
650 4 |a Dodd–Frank Act 
650 4 |a Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
650 4 |a Whistleblowing 
700 1 |a Free, Clinton  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Jidin, Radzi  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Monroe, Gary S.  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Turner, Michael J.  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Journal of business ethics  |d Dordrecht : Springer, 1982  |g 151(2018), 1, Seite 165-178  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)270937129  |w (DE-600)1478688-6  |w (DE-576)121465284  |x 1573-0697  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:151  |g year:2018  |g number:1  |g pages:165-178 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3215-6  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4033724354 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1785665456 
LOK |0 005 20220112043909 
LOK |0 008 220112||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2021-12-30#6C50DE0576F474C450DBF36EF5BAA19284FCF63A 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw 
STA 0 0 |a Whistleblowing 
STB 0 0 |a Lanceurs d'alerte 
STC 0 0 |a Alerta,Whistleblowing,Whistleblowing 
STD 0 0 |a Whistleblowing 
STF 0 0 |a 吹哨人 
STG 0 0 |a Denúncia,Whistleblowing,Whistleblowing 
STH 0 0 |a Доносительство 
STI 0 0 |a Whistleblowing 
SYE 0 0 |a Missstand,Whistle blowing