RT Article
T1 Duty and Boycotts: A Kantian Analysis
JF Journal of business ethics
VO 149
IS 1
SP 117
OP 126
A1 Robinson, Richard
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2018
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1785664298
AB The societal benefits derived from competitive markets certainly depend upon participants conforming to generally accepted notions of moral duty. These notions include negative duties such as those against fraud, deception, and coercion and also positive duties such as those that favor beneficence but with limits. This investigation examines the extent that product, capital, and internal-labor markets are capable of imposing conformance to society’s expectations of duty through both formally and informally organized boycotts. A categorization of classic and recent boycotts into those motivated by (i) establishing new norms, or (ii) enforcing existing generally accepted norms is provided. This categorization helps to explain why some boycotts are successful, and others not. Through this exploration, a contribution to the resolution of the so called “Adam Smith problem” concerning the morality-enforcing capability of the invisible hand is offered.
K1 Pricing ethics
K1 Market efficiency
K1 Duty
K1 Boycotts
DO 10.1007/s10551-016-3028-7