What Does CEOs’ Pay-for-Performance Reveal About Shareholders’ Attitude Toward Earnings Overstatements?
If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of...
| Authors: | ; ; |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2017
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| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2017, Volume: 146, Issue: 2, Pages: 419-450 |
| Further subjects: | B
G32
B G34 B L21 B M52 B M41 B J33 B CEO incentive pay B M43 B Sarbanes–Oxley Act B Pay-for-performance sensitivity B Firm objectives B Earnings management B Shareholder myopia |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
