Donate Money, but Whose? An Empirical Study of Ultimate Control Rights, Agency Problems, and Corporate Philanthropy in China

Using empirical evidence gathered from Chinese listed companies, this article explores the relationship between micro-governance mechanisms and corporate philanthropy from a corporate governance perspective. In China’s emerging market, ultimate controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises (SO...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Tan, Justin (Author) ; Tang, Yuejun (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2016
In: Journal of business ethics
Year: 2016, Volume: 134, Issue: 4, Pages: 593-610
Further subjects:B Deviation of voting rights and cash flow rights
B Ultimate control right
B Type II agency problem
B Corporate Philanthropy
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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520 |a Using empirical evidence gathered from Chinese listed companies, this article explores the relationship between micro-governance mechanisms and corporate philanthropy from a corporate governance perspective. In China’s emerging market, ultimate controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are reluctant to donate their assets or resources to charitable organizations; in private enterprises (PEs) marked by more deviation in voting and cash flow rights, such donations tend to be more likely. However, the ultimate controllers in PEs refuse to donate assets or resources they control or own, which implies that corporate philanthropy by PEs comes at the cost of others, through assets or resources owned by minority shareholders. Even after devastating natural disasters such as the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, the controlling shareholders continue to express reluctance to donate any assets they control. Despite widespread evidence that corporate philanthropy boosts corporate growth and profitability, these ultimate controllers indicate no intention to donate their own money as a means to improve corporate performance. 
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