RT Article
T1 The Contained-Rivalry Requirement and a ‘Triple Feature’ Program for Business Ethics
JF Journal of business ethics
VO 115
IS 1
SP 167
OP 182
A1 Martin, Dominic
LA English
YR 2013
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/178564792X
AB This paper proposes a description of the moral obligations of economic agents. It will show that a threefold division should be adopted to distinguish moral obligations applying to their interactions in the market, obligations applying to their interactions inside business firms and obligations applying to their interactions with agents outside the market. Competition might be permissible in the first case since markets are special patterns of social interactions (called adversarial schemes). They produce their benefits when agents try to satisfy exclusive preferences at the expense of others. However, moral obligations inside the firm and moral obligations outside the market are of a different nature. This argument will be developed in the two first parts of this paper. In the third part, it will outline the relevant strengths of that account in relation with two popular views of economic agents’ moral obligations: the shareholder primacy view and the stakeholder theory.
K1 Stakeholder Theory
K1 Shareholder primacy
K1 Cooperation
K1 Competition
K1 Market
K1 Rivalry
K1 Adversarial ethics
DO 10.1007/s10551-012-1369-4