The Moderating Effects from Corporate Governance Characteristics on the Relationship Between Available Slack and Community-Based Firm Performance

Recent perspectives on community investments suggest that they are opportunities for firms to create value for shareholders and other stakeholders. However, many corporate managers are still influenced by a widely held belief that such investments erode profits and are therefore unjustifiable from a...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Authors: Harrison, Jeffrey S. (Author) ; Coombs, Joseph E. 1966- (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Verificar disponibilidade: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado em: 2012
Em: Journal of business ethics
Ano: 2012, Volume: 107, Número: 4, Páginas: 409-422
Outras palavras-chave:B Agency Theory
B Stakeholder Theory
B Governança corporativa
B Organizational slack
B Community-based performance
Acesso em linha: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descrição
Resumo:Recent perspectives on community investments suggest that they are opportunities for firms to create value for shareholders and other stakeholders. However, many corporate managers are still influenced by a widely held belief that such investments erode profits and are therefore unjustifiable from an agency perspective. In this paper, we refine and test theory regarding countervailing forces that influence community-based firm performance. We hypothesize that high levels of available slack will be associated with higher community-based performance, but that this relationship will be moderated by three important governance variables: board independence, investment fund ownership, and CEO ownership. We find support for our hypotheses in longitudinal study of a large sample of U.S. corporations.
ISSN:1573-0697
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10551-011-1046-z