The Moderating Effects from Corporate Governance Characteristics on the Relationship Between Available Slack and Community-Based Firm Performance
Recent perspectives on community investments suggest that they are opportunities for firms to create value for shareholders and other stakeholders. However, many corporate managers are still influenced by a widely held belief that such investments erode profits and are therefore unjustifiable from a...
| Authors: | ; |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2012
|
| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2012, Volume: 107, Issue: 4, Pages: 409-422 |
| Further subjects: | B
Corporate governance
B Agency Theory B Stakeholder Theory B Organizational slack B Community-based performance |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The Moderating Effects from Corporate Governance Characteristics on the Relationship Between Available Slack and Community-Based Firm Performance |
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| 520 | |a Recent perspectives on community investments suggest that they are opportunities for firms to create value for shareholders and other stakeholders. However, many corporate managers are still influenced by a widely held belief that such investments erode profits and are therefore unjustifiable from an agency perspective. In this paper, we refine and test theory regarding countervailing forces that influence community-based firm performance. We hypothesize that high levels of available slack will be associated with higher community-based performance, but that this relationship will be moderated by three important governance variables: board independence, investment fund ownership, and CEO ownership. We find support for our hypotheses in longitudinal study of a large sample of U.S. corporations. | ||
| 601 | |a Performance | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Stakeholder Theory | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Organizational slack | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corporate Governance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Community-based performance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Agency Theory | |
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| STA | 0 | 0 | |a Corporate governance,Corporate control |
| STB | 0 | 0 | |a Gouvernement d'entreprise |
| STC | 0 | 0 | |a Gobierno corporativo |
| STD | 0 | 0 | |a Corporate governance,Governo d'impresa,Governo d'impresa |
| STE | 0 | 0 | |a 企业管理,商团治理,公司治理 |
| STF | 0 | 0 | |a 企業管理,商團治理,公司治理 |
| STG | 0 | 0 | |a Governança corporativa |
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| STI | 0 | 0 | |a Εταιρική διακυβέρνηση,Corporate governance |
| SYE | 0 | 0 | |a Unternehmenskontrolle,Unternehmensüberwachung |
