Corporate Governance and CSR Nexus

Some argue that managers over-invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to build their personal reputations as good global citizens. Others claim that CEOs strategically choose CSR activities to reduce the probability of CEO turnover in a future period through indirect support from...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs: Harjoto, Maretno A. (Auteur) ; Jo, Hoje (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publié: 2011
Dans: Journal of business ethics
Année: 2011, Volume: 100, Numéro: 1, Pages: 45-67
Sujets non-standardisés:B firm value and performance
B Responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise
B Gouvernement d'entreprise
Accès en ligne: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Résumé:Some argue that managers over-invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to build their personal reputations as good global citizens. Others claim that CEOs strategically choose CSR activities to reduce the probability of CEO turnover in a future period through indirect support from activists. Still others assert that firms use CSR activities to signal their product quality. We find that firms use governance mechanisms, along with CSR engagement, to reduce conflicts of interest between managers and non-investing stakeholders. Employing a large and extensive sample of firms within Russell 2000, S&500 and Domini 400 indices during the 1993–2004 period, we find that consistent with the conflict-resolution hypothesis, the CSR choice is positively associated with governance characteristics, including board independence, institutional ownership, and analyst following. In addition, after correcting for endogeneity of CSR engagement, our results show that CSR engagement positively influences operating performance and firm value, supporting the conflict-resolution hypothesis as opposed to the over-investment and strategic-choice arguments. We find only a weak support of the product-signaling hypothesis as a major motive of CSR engagement.
ISSN:1573-0697
Contient:Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10551-011-0772-6