Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders
In recent years, firms have greatly increased the amount of resources allocated to activities classified as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). While an increase in CSR expenditure may be consistent with firm value maximization if it is a response to changes in stakeholders’ preferences, we argue...
| Authors: | ; |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2010
|
| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2010, Volume: 97, Issue: 1, Pages: 71-86 |
| Further subjects: | B
Corporate social responsibility
B Corporate governance B Ownership structure |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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| 520 | |a In recent years, firms have greatly increased the amount of resources allocated to activities classified as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). While an increase in CSR expenditure may be consistent with firm value maximization if it is a response to changes in stakeholders’ preferences, we argue that a firm’s insiders (managers and large blockholders) may seek to over- invest in CSR for their private benefit to the extent that doing so improves their reputations as good global citizens and has a “warm-glow” effect. We test this hypothesis by investigating the relation between firms’ CSR ratings and their ownership and capital structures. Employing a unique data set that categorizes the largest 3000 U.S. corporations as either socially responsible (SR) or socially irresponsible (SI), we find that on average, insiders’ ownership and leverage are negatively related to the firm’s social rating, while institutional ownership is uncorrelated with it. Assuming that higher CSR ratings is associated with higher CSR expenditure level, these results support our hypothesis that insiders induce firms to over-invest in CSR when they bear little of the cost of doing so. | ||
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| STA | 0 | 0 | |a Corporate governance,Corporate control,Corporate social responsibility |
| STB | 0 | 0 | |a Gouvernement d'entreprise,Responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise |
| STC | 0 | 0 | |a Gobierno corporativo,Responsabilidad social de la empresa |
| STD | 0 | 0 | |a Corporate governance,Governo d'impresa,Governo d'impresa,Corporate social responsibility,Responsabilità sociale d'impresa,Responsabilità sociale d'impresa |
| STE | 0 | 0 | |a 企业管理,商团治理,公司治理 |
| STF | 0 | 0 | |a 企業社會責任,企業管理,商團治理,公司治理 |
| STG | 0 | 0 | |a Governança corporativa,Responsabilidade social da empresa |
| STH | 0 | 0 | |a Корпоративная социальная ответственность,Корпоративное управление |
| STI | 0 | 0 | |a Εταιρική διακυβέρνηση,Corporate governance,Εταιρική κοινωνική ευθύνη,Corporate social responsibility |
| SYE | 0 | 0 | |a Unternehmenskontrolle,Unternehmensüberwachung , Corporate social responsibility,Corporate citizenship,Corporate environment responsibility,Corporate environmental responsibility,Corporate responsibility,Corporate sustainability management,Corporate volunteering,CSR (Corporate social responsibility),Environment social governance,Environmental, social and corporate governance,Environmental, social and governance,ESG,Gesellschaftliche Unternehmensverantwortung,Gesellschaftliche Verantwortung von Unternehmen,Gesellschaftliches Engagement von Unternehmen,Nachhaltigkeitsmanagement,Soziale Verantwortung von Unternehmen,Soziales Engagement von Unternehmen,Unternehmensverantwortung,Unternehmerische Sozialverantwortung,CSR,Corporate Citizenship,Unternehmerische Gesellschaftsverantwortung,Unternehmerische Sozialverantwortung,Unternehmen |
