Corporate Lobbying in Antidumping Cases: Looking into the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
Is protection for sale? In this research, we examine the effect of corporate lobbying on the disbursement of proceeds of the recent antidumping petitions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, the so-called Byrd amendment. With the use of novel U.S. Customs Service data on the disbursem...
Authors: | ; |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer
2010
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In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2010, Volume: 96, Issue: 3, Pages: 467-478 |
Further subjects: | B
Antidumping
B Lobbying B Protection B Byrd amendment |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Is protection for sale? In this research, we examine the effect of corporate lobbying on the disbursement of proceeds of the recent antidumping petitions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, the so-called Byrd amendment. With the use of novel U.S. Customs Service data on the disbursements of the antidumping duties to the injured firms, we find that the petitioning firms that spend more on lobbying gain larger proceeds. We conclude that firms that lobby are the ones that get protection, not necessarily the healthy ones. |
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ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-010-0478-1 |