No More Lemmings, Please – Reflections on the Communal Authority Thesis
A key feature of ISCT is the claim that individuals are required to comply with the norms that are “accepted by a clear majority of the community as standing for an ethical principle” [Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, The Ties that Bind (Harvard Business School Press, Boson, MA), p. 39], so long as these...
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2009
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| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Anno: 2009, Volume: 88, Fascicolo: 4, Pagine: 717-728 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Communitarianism
B Hayek B Consent B ISCT B Habermas B Cultural Relativism B author- ity B social contracts B Social norms |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | A key feature of ISCT is the claim that individuals are required to comply with the norms that are “accepted by a clear majority of the community as standing for an ethical principle” [Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, The Ties that Bind (Harvard Business School Press, Boson, MA), p. 39], so long as these norms are consistent with hypernorms. I refer to this as the communal authority thesis. Many people see the communal authority thesis as an attractive feature of ISCT, a welcome move away from the abstraction of principle-based ethical theories. I argue in this article, however, that the communal authority thesis is false: we do not have a general moral obligation to comply with the accepted norms in our community. I consider and reject several defenses of the communal authority thesis, including the central arguments put forward by Donaldson and Dunfee. I go on to develop my own position, which accepts that social norms can be important from the moral point of view. However, I argue that social norms are important because they can shape the morally important features of our situation, not because we have a general obligation to comply with these norms as such. I use examples such as gift giving in Japan and the housing crisis to illustrate my position. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-009-0328-1 |