RT Article
T1 The Manufacturing Sector’s Environmental Motives: A Game-theoretic Analysis
JF Journal of business ethics
VO 79
IS 3
SP 333
OP 344
A1 Fairchild, Richard John
LA English
YR 2008
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1785629913
AB What motivates manufacturing companies to make costly investments in producing in an environmentally clean manner? The traditional argument is that such behaviour is value reducing, and that therefore, firms must be forced by regulation to invest in “green” production processes. A counter-argument is that firms have an incentive to make environmental investments in an attempt to attract “green” consumers and investors, hence gaining competitive advantage over their rivals. In this paper, we employ a game-theoretic approach that demonstrates that competing firms’ incentives to make voluntary investments in environmental “clean-up” are affected by the size of the investment costs and the extent of consumer and investor “green” awareness. We argue that an increase in green behaviour can be induced by a combination of governmental subsidies for firms that invest in environmentally clean production processes, together with an education program that promotes “green” awareness amongst consumers, investors and the managers themselves.
K1 game-theory
K1 investors’ and consumers’ reactions
K1 spatial differentiation
K1 corporate environmental behaviour
DO 10.1007/s10551-007-9401-9