The Manufacturing Sector’s Environmental Motives: A Game-theoretic Analysis

What motivates manufacturing companies to make costly investments in producing in an environmentally clean manner? The traditional argument is that such behaviour is value reducing, and that therefore, firms must be forced by regulation to invest in “green” production processes. A counter-argument i...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Fairchild, Richard John (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2008
In: Journal of business ethics
Year: 2008, Volume: 79, Issue: 3, Pages: 333-344
Further subjects:B investors’ and consumers’ reactions
B spatial differentiation
B game-theory
B corporate environmental behaviour
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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