RT Article
T1 Deadly Drugs and the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Reply to Tully
JF Journal of business ethics
VO 68
IS 2
SP 143
OP 151
A1 Masek, Lawrence
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2006
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/178562640X
AB In a recent contribution to this journal, Patrick Tully criticizes my view that the doctrine of double effect does not prohibit a pharmaceutical company from selling a drug that has potentially fatal side-effects and that does not treat a life-threatening condition. Tully alleges my account is too permissive and makes the doctrine irrelevant to decisions about selling harmful products. In the following paper, I respond to Tully’s objections and show that he misinterprets my position and misstates some elements of the doctrine of double effect. I also show how the doctrine constrains some decisions about marketing drugs with potentially fatal side-effects.
K1 Proportionality
K1 principle of double effect
K1 Natural Law
K1 material cooperation
K1 Intrinsic evil
K1 Intention
K1 intended effect
K1 formal cooperation
K1 foreseen effect
K1 Consequentialism
DO 10.1007/s10551-006-9060-2