The Effects of Attitudes, Subjective Norms, Attributions, and Individualism–Collectivism on Managers’ Responses to Bribery in Organizations: Evidence from a Developing Nation
The goal of this study was to introduce a model explaining how managers’ attitudes, subjective norms, attributions, and the individualism–collectivism cultural dimension affect the way managers’ deal with employee bribery in organizations. Twenty-six internal and external attributions related to bri...
Authors: | ; |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer
2005
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In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2005, Volume: 61, Issue: 2, Pages: 111-127 |
Further subjects: | B
Regression Analysis
B Structure Interview B Subject Matter B Subjective Norm B Economic Growth |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | The goal of this study was to introduce a model explaining how managers’ attitudes, subjective norms, attributions, and the individualism–collectivism cultural dimension affect the way managers’ deal with employee bribery in organizations. Twenty-six internal and external attributions related to bribery were identified through a series of structured interviews with 65 subject matter experts. These attributions, together with the other variables in the model, were evaluated by 354 (n = 354) Ecuadorian managers. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that attitudes and external attributions significantly predicted managers’ intentions to discipline employees who accepted a bribe. In addition, external attributions mediated the relationship between individualism–collectivism and intent to discipline corrupt employees. Implications for the management of bribery in Latin American organizations are discussed. |
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ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-005-8712-y |