Meeting needs and business obligations: An argument for the libertarian skeptic
In this paper I argue that if we are to have any defensible property rights at all, we must recognize a fundamental commitment to helping those in need. The argument has significant implications for all who claim defensible property rights. In this paper I concentrate on some of the implications thi...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
1996
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| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Jahr: 1996, Band: 15, Heft: 6, Seiten: 695-702 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Stakeholder Theory
B Significant Implication B Fundamental Commitment B Normative Basis B Economic Growth |
| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this paper I argue that if we are to have any defensible property rights at all, we must recognize a fundamental commitment to helping those in need. The argument has significant implications for all who claim defensible property rights. In this paper I concentrate on some of the implications this argument has for redefining business obligations. In particular, I show why those who typically would be quite resistant to the idea that businesses have any obligations to assist others in need must acknowledge this fundamental obligation. I also suggest how this argument contributes to our understanding of the normative basis of Stakeholder Theory. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF00411804 |