RT Article
T1 State-Owned Enterprises as Bribe Payers: The Role of Institutional Environment
JF Journal of business ethics
VO 159
IS 1
SP 221
OP 238
A1 Shaheer, Noman
A1 Yi, Jingtao
A1 Li, Sali
A1 Chen, Liang
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2019
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1785601458
AB Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption—the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subjected to potential managerial rent-seeking behaviors, which disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity relative to privately owned enterprises. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery.
K1 State-owned enterprises
K1 Managerial rent seeking
K1 Institutional Theory
K1 Bribery
K1 Agency Theory
DO 10.1007/s10551-017-3768-z