God, Time and the Kalām Cosmological Argument

The Kalām cosmological argument deploys the following causal principle: whatever begins to exist has a cause. Yet, under what conditions does something ‘begin to exist’? What does it mean to say that ‘X begins to exist at t’? William Lane Craig has offered and defended various accounts that seek to...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bobier, Christopher Alan (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Netherlands 2013
In: Sophia
Year: 2013, Volume: 52, Issue: 4, Pages: 593-600
Further subjects:B Kalām argument
B Creation
B Time
B William Lane Craig
B God
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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