Mind, Mortality and Material Being

Many religiously minded materialist philosophers have attempted to understand the doctrine of the survival of death from within a physicalist approach. Their goal is not to show the doctrine false, but to explain how it can be true. One such approach has been developed by Peter van Inwagen. After ex...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Anders, Paul C. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Netherlands 2011
In: Sophia
Year: 2011, Volume: 50, Issue: 1, Pages: 25-37
Further subjects:B van Inwagen
B survival of death
B Metaphysics
B God
B Materialism
B Personal Identity
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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