RT Article
T1 The Metaphysical Morality of Francis Hutcheson: A Consideration of Hutcheson’s Critique of Moral Fitness Theory
JF Sophia
VO 46
IS 3
SP 263
OP 275
A1 Sheridan, Patricia
LA English
PB Springer Netherlands
YR 2007
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1785589776
AB Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact, Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed, and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
K1 British moralists
K1 Moral sense theory
K1 Moral fitness theory
K1 Samuel Clarke
K1 Francis Hutcheson
DO 10.1007/s11841-007-0033-4