On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis’ second critique
In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thin...
主要作者: | |
---|---|
格式: | 電子 Article |
語言: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
出版: |
2006
|
In: |
Sophia
Year: 2006, 卷: 45, 發布: 2, Pages: 131-138 |
Further subjects: | B
Human Freedom
B Adequate Explanation B Moral Evil B Natural Disposition B Receive Nature |
在線閱讀: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |